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The Spence model (1975) is extended so that customers’ utility depends on their 
disposition to the firm in addition to quantity and quality of the good consumed. 
Disposition is determined by customers’ perception of firm’s pricing and quality 
decisions, which perception is ‘reference dependent’. The profit maximising and efficient 
price and quality combinations are derived. Adjustment to a change in economic 
conditions may call for price rigidity, quality rigidity or both depending on the level of 
the reference price and quality. 
 
                                                 
* I would like to thank Peter Earl and Ian McDonald for their thoughtful comments on 
this work. All errors remain my responsibility. 
 Loss Aversion, Price and Quality 
 
Virtually all goods have attributes other than their price. Aspects of quality, 
interpreted broadly to include durability, service level, reliability of supply, quantity per 
unit package, and advertising to establish a brand image, can be varied for most goods. 
As customers judge these goods on the basis of both price and quality, the choice of 
quality is often as important to a firm as is its choice of price. Therefore, following a 
change in economic conditions (such as a demand or cost shock), firms will wish to re-
evaluate their provision of quality as well as their price. However, although Carlton 
(1989) has emphasised it is not price adjustment alone which clears markets following a 
change in economic conditions, the overwhelming volume of the literature focuses on 
price setting assumes quality is set exogenously.  
This paper is concerned with a monopolist’s adjustment of price and quality to 
changed economic conditions. It is motivated by the casual observation that in some 
instances firms adjust price without varying quality, while in other instances vary quality 
without adjusting price. For example during and following renovations (which lowers 
then raises the ease and enjoyment of shopping) a retailer does not change price. 
However the same retailer may have a post-Christmas sale with a given store 
configuration. A restaurant that becomes popular allows service standards (longer waits 
for a table, busier and less attentive waiting staff, more crowding) to fall rather than raise 
price. The same restaurant may offer discounted meals at lunchtimes or quiet nights. 
Breakfast cereals are offered as ‘20% more at no extra cost’, yet later the price of the 
standard box is adjusted for inflation. 
These examples suggest that quality may adjust to clear the market when price 
doesn’t, and visa versa. Alternatively neither may change, leaving the entire burden of 
adjustment on quantity. The literature does not provide an explanation of these 
combinations of price and quality rigidity. It is well known now that price does not 
always change to clear markets, and there is a very large literature on this (Carlton 1989 
and Blinder et. al. 1998).   
1    However there is very little consideration of issue of quality rigidity in the 
literature. The classic (full information) treatments of quality choice by a monopolist is 
Spence (1975)1, which in turn builds on (among others) Dorfman and Stiener (1954) and 
Swan (1970). The Spence model does not allow for the combination of price and quality 
rigidity discussed above. For example, when buyer utility is separable in quantity and 
quality, the Spence model predicts a monopolist will choose the cost minimising level of 
quality. If, in addition, cost exhibits constant returns to scale2, the cost minimising level 
of quality is independent of output.3 In this case, quality is independent of changes in 
demand, a result known as the Swan invariance principle.4  Although quality is invariant 
to demand changes it is not invariant to cost changes. A change in either marginal cost or 
the marginal cost of quality will alter both price and quality. Thus, under the conditions 
of the Swan Invariance Principle (separable utility and constant returns to scale), a 
restaurant should never change quality in response to changes in popularity while should 
adjust quality continually to changes in input prices (wages, the price of food etc). As the 
conditions of the Swan Invariance Principle are likely to be reasonable for restaurants, the 
predictions of the Spence model are at odds with observation. 
It might be argued that the above examples are best explained by appealing to the 
cost of changing price (menu costs) and the cost of changing quality. However it is well 
known that menu costs are a fragile explanator of price rigidity (see Blanchard and 
Fisher, 1989, pp. 386-8). Similarly, costs of changing quality would appear to be a fragile 
explanation of quality rigidity. In many cases the cost of changing quality is trivial. For 
example, consider a pizza shop that uses exactly the same quantity and quality of 
ingredients in its pizza toppings, even though the relative price of these ingredients 
varies. 
                                                 
1 see also Sheshinski (1976) 
2 Constant returns to scale means the cost of quality is linear in output.  
3 When constant returns to scale are assumed, quality can be interpreted as having the 
properties of a rival good. That is, quality is attached to the good (such as the quality of a 
restaurant meal) rather than the entire output (such as the quality of a road). 
4 The Swan Invariance Principle is usually to imply that monopoly firms produce the 
efficient level of quality. See Sibly (2002) for a demonstration of this result under these 
conditions.  
2    To provide a robust explanation of the above observations, this paper utilises the 
methodology developed by Sibly (2002). It extends the Spence model so that customers’ 
utility is postulated to not only depend on the quantity and quality of the good consumed, 
but on also on their disposition to the firm.5 When customers’ utility depends on the level 
of disposition, the firm’s demand curve depends on price, quality and disposition. A 
decrease in disposition causes some customers to either change suppliers, leave the 
market or to purchase less frequently.   
There are a number of plausible theoretical justifications for the postulate that 
customers’ utility depends on disposition. From a psychological perspective, one reason 
is simply that social relationships are important to human beings. The strength of the 
social relationship between a firm and its customers will affect the latter’s disposition and 
hence their willingness to buy from that firm. Secondly, Thaler (1991) argues that two 
‘kinds’ of utility can be associated with the purchase of a good. He calls the first 
‘acquisition utility’, which represents the value of the good relative to its price. This is 
the usual notion of utility used by economists. In addition Thaler argues that any 
purchase is also characterised by a ‘transaction utility’. This component of utility 
measures the ‘merits of deal’: it would be expected to be influenced by the disposition of 
the customer to the firm. Thirdly, Okun (1981) offers another mechanism by which utility 
depends on customer disposition that is more within the economics tradition. He argues 
that ongoing relationships develop between firms and customers so that the latter can 
economise on search and transaction costs. An ‘implicit contract’ between firms and 
customers results, under which the firm agrees to set stable and fair prices. The level of 
disposition measures the customer’s perception of their ‘contract’ with their firms. 
Customer disposition will influence firm’s demand whether or not customers 
make repeat-purchases. When customers do not make repeated purchases, their 
disposition arises from the reputation, in particular the standing in the community, of the 
firm. When customers do make repeated purchases, disposition will reflect both the 
customer’s personal experiences with the firm and its reputation 
                                                 
5 Disposition might be thought of as a firm’s goodwill. However goodwill, as used by 
accountants, refers to all of a firm’s intangible assets. The term ‘disposition’ is preferred 
in this paper because it refers specifically to the disposition of customers to the firm. 
3    The firm’s pricing and quality decisions are assumed to be the determinants of 
customer’s disposition to the firm because they represents the ‘terms of trade’ between 
customers and the firm. In line with recent psychological research (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1991) and marketing literature (Monroe, 1990 and Rajendran 1999), it is 
assumed that each customer’s perception of price and quality is ‘reference dependent’: 
customers judge price and quality relative to a reference price and reference quality level. 
The reference price and reference quality level act a benchmark against which the actual 
price and quality are compared to determine disposition.  
Psychological research indicates that the reference price and quality is determined 
by how the purchase is posed, or ‘framed’, in customers’ minds (see for example Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1986). Experiments have indicated that peoples’ reference levels 
typically represent either the ‘status quo’ or, alternatively, their view of a ‘fair’ outcome 
(Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1991). Although these need not be the same thing,  
Kahneman et. al. (1986 p. 730-1) note that people eventually “adapt their views of 
fairness to the norms of actual behavior”. Thus, with time, the status quo becomes to be 
perceived as fair ‘because it is normal, not necessarily because it is just’. It is assumed 
therefore that the reference price and reference quality level are given by the existing 
price and quality level.  
In calculating their disposition to the firm, customers may be particularly 
antagonised by losses (ie price increases or quality decreases) relative to the reference 
levels. In this case customers exhibit ‘loss aversion’ (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). 
Loss aversion refers to a situation in which a loss to an economic agent relative to their 
reference level is weighted more heavily in the calculation of utility than a gain of equal 
magnitude. There have been a considerable number of experimental and empirical 
findings supporting the existence of loss aversion in a variety of contexts (see Kahneman,  
Knetsch and  Thaler, 1991, for a survey). 
Loss aversion creates a kink in each customer’s demand function at the reference 
price and quality. An increase in price (or a decrease in quality) relative to the reference 
level causes a decrease in each customer’s demand that is greater in magnitude than the 
increase following an equivalent decrease in price (or increase in quality). Consequently 
4    the firm faces a similar kink in its demand function.6 It is demonstrated in this paper that 
there is a there is a range of demand or marginal cost that is consistent with a profit-
maximising firm setting a given reference price and reference quality level. Consequently 
prices and quality are rigid in response to certain demand and cost shocks when 
customers exhibit loss aversion. In addition, however, it is shown that some shocks will 
cause a price adjustment but not quality adjustment, while other shocks result in quality 
adjustment without price adjustment. In this way firms adjust to the shock without 
imposing two ‘losses’ on customers. The model is therefore consistent with the casual 
observation described above. 
The model is also used to consider the efficiency of the firm. It is shown that, 
when the firm has a kinked demand function, there is a set of reference price and 
reference quality levels that are efficient. As with the monopoly case, the efficient price 
and quality level may not change in response to changed economic conditions. On the 
other hand, to maintain efficiency following changed economic conditions, a change in 
price alone or quality alone may be required.  
The treatment of quality differs in emphasis from the literature concerning the 
choice of quality by a monopolist under perfect information (Schmalensee, 1979). Rather 
than consider how the profit maximising and efficient price and quality adjust to a change 
in economic conditions, this literature is primarily concerned with how the provision of 
quality by a monopolist is influenced by regulation.  
Much of the modern literature focuses on the impact of asymmetric information 
on quality. However in the examples cited above information is symmetric across agents. 
Asymmetric information is therefore not responsible for the price and quality responses 
of the firm. Furthermore the paper is concerned with exploring the implications of loss 
aversion for price and quality setting in the least complicated setting. Therefore the model 
presented in this paper assumes agents have full information. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the representative consumer 
model. Section 2 considers the firm’s profit maximising level of price and quality. The 
                                                 
6 This behaviour is consistent with the notion that customers punish firms for acting 
unfairly by setting unfair price and quality levels. The idea that agents act in a retaliatory 
manner to unfairness has been supported by considerable experimental evidence. See 
Fehr and Gächter (2000) for a survey of this work. 
5    efficient level of price and quality is determined in section 3. Section 4 concludes the 
paper. 
 
6    1. The Representative Consumer and Firm 
 
The representative consumer gains utility from consuming n goods (see Dixit and 
Stiglitz 1977, Spence 1976). A representative consumer model is chosen explicitly to 
avoid considering the complicating issues of strategic interaction between firms and 
therefore to allow a focus on the role of loss aversion. It is assumed the consumer’s utility 
function has the CES form: 






1/ρ     (1) 
where xi is the consumer's consumption of good, where i, i=1,..,n, si is the quality or 
service level per unit of good i, gi measures the disposition to the firm which produces 
good i  and αi>0 is a weight.7 The goods are assumed to be substitutes so that ρ<0.  Let 
yi= si
σxi be the quality adjusted consumption of good i. For a given level of disposition, it 
can be shown that σ is the elasticity of substitution between quality and quantity in yi.8 It 





 pixi    =   I         ( 2 )  
where pi is the price of good i and I is consumer income. 
Disposition depends the value of price relative to its reference level and the value 
of quality with respect to its reference level. Specifically:  
gi = (pi /pi
R)-µi (si/si
R)νi        ( 3 )  
where pi
R is the reference price level of good i and si
R is the reference quality level of good 
i. Loss aversion is captured by assuming: 
µi =  
⎩
⎨
⎧λ1  if pi > p
R
i
λ2   if pi < p
R
i  
       ( 4 a )  
and: 
                                                 
7 Using Thaler’s (1991) interpretation, the contribution to utility of good i, (gisi
σxi)
ρ, can 
be thought of as consisting of acquisition utility (si
σxi)
ρ and transaction utility gi
ρ . 
8 From (5) below yi = (αi
ηgi     
η-1^ p
η-1Ι)si    
ση /pi
η. The elasticity of substitution is therefore σ. 
7    νi =  
⎩
⎨
⎧λ2  if si > s
R
i
λ1  if si < s
R
i  
       ( 4 b )  
where λ1 > λ2. Loss aversion is absent if λ1 = λ2. 
  Before proceeding with the analysis, the reasons for restricting the functional 
forms of the utility and disposition functions are stated. The specific functional form for 
the utility function, (1), and for disposition (3) are chosen for the following reasons: 
(i)  Tversky and Kahneman, (1991) argue that an iso-elastic formulation, such as (3), 
is consistent with their experimental findings. 
(ii)   These functional forms allow a tractable mathematical analysis and a graphical 
analysis. 
(iii) Iso-elastic functional forms allow an economic analysis to be undertaken while 
holding the value of a fundamental concept (elasticity) constant.   
(iv) It is shown that, without loss aversion, quality is rigid with respect to demand 
shocks. This is consistent with the standard approach in economics that excludes 
consideration of quality, and thus highlights the impact of loss aversion. 
(v)  With fully general functional forms it is not possible to tell whether an increase in 
demand increases or decreases quality. This formulation takes a ‘neutral stance’ 
on this ambiguity. 
 
Households are price and quality takers, and thus treat pi, si and gi as exogenous. 
They maximise utility, (1), subject to the budget constraint (2). Household demand for 
good i is therefore: 





η     (5) 
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8    where η ≡ 1/1-ρ>1 is the elasticity of substitution. As n is assumed large, ^ p will be 







By substituting the expression for disposition (3) into (5), demand for good i can 
be written as: 
xi(pi,si,pi
R,si
R) = Aip i
-ηs i        σ(η-1)(pi/p)-µi(η-1)(si/si
R) νi (η-1)   











R)-νi(η-1) Ι, φi=η(1+µi)-µi and κi=(η-1)(σ+νi). The 
demand function, (7), will be that faced by firm i. 
  The demand function (7) is kinked at the reference price and quality. It is basis of 
the analysis below. Those readers who were interested in the implications of a kink 
demand function, which arises for reasons other than loss aversion, could interpret the 
following analysis beginning with (7). 
9    2. Profit Maximising Price and Quality 
The cost of providing a unit of good i with quality level si is assumed to be χsi, 
where χ is the (constant) cost a unit of quality. As the cost of quality varies with output, 
this assumption suggests that the quality is embodied in each unit of output. Thus quality 
exhibits 'constant returns to scale' and thus has the property of a private good. The profit 
of firm i, πi, is given by: 
πi(pi,si,pi
R,si
R) = (pi-c -χsi)xi (pi,si,pi
R,si
R)    (8) 
where c is the (constant) marginal cost of production. The firm chooses price and quality 






⎪ ⎧p2(si) if pi
R > p2(si)
pi
R if p1(si) < pi
R < p2(si)
p1(si) if pi
R < p1(si) 
     (9) 
 
where pj(si) = θj(c+χsi) and θj=
(η-1)(1+λj)+1
(η-1)(1+λj)  >1. When quality is chosen to maximise 





⎪ ⎧s1(pi) if si
R>s1(pi)
si
R if  s2(pi) < si
R<s1(pi)
 s2(pi)  if si
R< s2(pi)




 ξjχ and ξj = 
(η-1)(σ+λj)+1
(η-1)(σ+λj)  > θj > 1. The profit maximising price and 
quality satisfies both (9) and (10).  
 
The model without loss aversion 
To aid in the interpretation of later results, consider the model in which loss 
aversion is absent, ie in which λ1= λ2=λ. In this case, from (9), the profit maximising 
price of firm i for a given level of quality, pi
*(si), satisfies: 
10    pi
*(si) =θ(c + χsi)       ( 1 1 )  
where θ=
(η-1)(1+λ)+1
(η-1)(1+λ) . Equation (11) indicates that price is a mark-up, θ, over total 
marginal cost, c + χsi. This result is a consequence of the assumption of constant 
elasticity of demand and constant marginal cost.  The profit maximising quality of firm i 





⎠ ⎟ ⎞ pi-c
χξ      (12) 
where ξ= 
(η-1)(σ+λ)+1




(η-1)(1-σ)       ( 1 3 )  




χ(1-σ)      ( 1 4 )  
 
As the reference price enters the demand function multiplicatively, it does directly 
determine the profit maximising price and quality. However, the impact on demand of the 
price level relative to its reference level is captured by the term λ in (13) and (14). 
  The solution to the model without loss aversion is depicted in figure 1. Figure 1 
shows various iso-profit curves π1, π2, π3, and the lines pi
*(si) and si
*(pi). The maximum 
profit level occurs at the point, πi
*, where the lines pi
*(si) and si
*(pi) intersect. This figure 
will be used late in the paper to compare the profit maximising price and quality with the 
efficient and constrained efficient.  
  It is readily seen from (13) and (14) that an increase in marginal cost of 
production, c, increases the price and quality of good i. (The pi
*(si) curve in figure 1 is 
shifted up by a greater amount than the si
*(pi) curve.) Indeed the elasticity of price and 
quality with respect to marginal cost is 1. Intuitively an increase in marginal cost causes 
an increase in price, causing customers to reduce quantity demanded. As quantity and 
quality are substitutes, there is an increase demand for quality. The elasticity of quality 
with respect to its cost is –1. An increase in the cost of quality causes an equal 
proportional decrease in the demand for quality, leaving total marginal cost unaffected. 
11    There is therefore no increase in price following an increase in the cost of quality.  The 
elasticity of price with respect to σ is σ/1-σ, while the elasticity of quality with respect to 
σ is σ(1+λ)/(σ+λ)(1-σ). Intuitively an increase in the substitutability of quantity and 
quality allows the firm to raise price by also raising quality. 
An increase in demand can be modelled in at least two ways: as an increase in 
income or a decrease in the elasticity of demand. Because of the iso-elastic nature of 
demand, and the presence of constant marginal cost, neither price nor quality change 
when there is a change in income.  
In the textbook model of monopoly, when marginal cost is constant, an increase 
in demand only increases price when it is associated with a decrease in the elasticity of 
demand. Thus when considering how to model an increase in demand in the above model 
it is appropriate to consider a decrease in the elasticity of demand. From (13) and (14) a 
decrease in the elasticity of demand increases price but does not affect quality. Observe 
that a decrease in the elasticity of demand occurs when there is a decrease in η, the 
elasticity of substitution between good i and other goods. As goods are less perfect 
substitutes for one another the markets are less competitive. As firms have more market 
power this enables them to raise price. Observe that the decrease in η does not change the 
customers’ substitutability of the quantity of good i for its quality, thus does not change 
the profit maximising level of quality. 
The case without relativities with respect to reference prices is considered by 
Spence (1975). It can be retrieved by setting λ=0. It is readily observed that the model 
with relativities (but without loss aversion) is qualitatively similar to that without 
relativities (especially in regard to the comparative statics). In particularly, the models 
both predict a price and quality response any change in marginal cost, no matter how 
small that change is. Furthermore in both models changes in the elasticity of demand 
leave quality unaffected. Thus little new is added by the introduction of ‘relativities’ per 
se. This conclusion changes with the addition of loss aversion 
12    The model with loss aversion. 
The solution to equations (9) and (10) depend on the value of the reference price 
and quality when λ1 > λ2. An example, with assumed values the reference price and 
quality, is shown in figure 2. The lines p1(si), p2(si) s1(pi) and s2(pi) are drawn in figure 2. 
These are used to depict the equation for the profit maximising choice of price, (10), and 
the profit maximising choice of quality (11). These functions are shown as the bold lines 
in figure 2. The profit maximising price and quality occur where the two bold lines 
intersect. In this particular example the profit maximising price is the reference price, 
while the profit maximising quality is si
*.  
The analysis of figure 2 can determine the profit maximising price and quality for 
any given the reference price and quality. Using this analysis for every combination of 
reference price and quality yields figure 3. In figure 3 the (s,p) plane is divided into nine 
regions. Each region indicates a different relationship between the reference price and 
quality and the profit maximising price and quality. This relationship is indicated by the 
name of the region. The first letter indicates the relationship between the profit max price 
and the reference price, while the second letter indicates the relationship between the 
profit maximising level quality and the reference level of quality: E indicates the 
reference level equals the profit maximising level, A indicates that the profit maximising 
level is above the reference level and B indicates the profit maximising level is below the 
reference level.   
The region labelled EE is bounded by the lines p1(si), p2(si) s1(pi) and s2(pi). The 
intersection of the lines pj(si) and sk(pi) occurs at points labelled Vjk in figure 3. 
Algebraically the points Vjk are given by: 
pi =
(η+λj(η-1))c
(η-1)(1-σ+λj−λk)      ( 1 5 )  
and: 
si =  si,jk ≡ 
(σ+λk)c
χ(1-σ+λj−λk)      ( 1 6 )  
If the reference price and quality lie in the region labelled EE they are the profit 
maximising levels of price and quality. When the reference price and quality lie in one of 
the other eight regions, the profit maximising level of price and quality lie on the 
13    boundary of the EE region. The reference price and quality depicted in figure 2 lie in the 
EB region.  The profit maximising price and quality lie on the right hand side boundary 
of the EE region, with the profit maximising price equal to the reference price. If the 
reference level of price and quality lies in the AB region, the profit maximising price and 
quality occurs that the intersection of the p1(si) and s1(pi) curves, ie on corner of the EE 
region labelled V11. 
  Figure 3 enables a comparative statics analysis. To undertake this analysis it is 
necessary to specify an initial configuration of the model, particularly with respect to the 
reference price and quality. To this end, define an equilibrium price as occurring when 
the reference price equals the actual price, and equilibrium quality as occurring when the 
reference quality equals the actual quality. Clearly an equilibrium price and quality must 
lie in the region EE. For comparative statics exercises assume that initially the firm sets 
the equilibrium price and quality.  
Consider an increase in c, the marginal cost of the firm. From (15) and (16) each 
of the four vertices of EE, Vjk, shifts in a north-east direction in figure 3. Therefore the 
entire region EE also shifts in that direction. The reference price will lay in one the (new) 
regions EE, AE, AA or EA, depending on the position of the reference point and the 
extent of the shift. If the shift is sufficiently small, the reference point will lie in the 
interior of EE. In this event price and quality will be rigid in response to the cost increase. 
If the shift leaves the reference point in the region EA (as might be the case if the 
reference quality was relatively low), the response of the firm is to raise quality but 
maintain price. If the shift leaves the reference point in the region AE (as might be the 
case if the reference price was relatively low), the response of the firm is to raise price 
but maintain quality. The firm only adjusts both price and quality, as would be the case in 
the absence of loss aversion, if the cost increase places the reference point in the region 
AA. 
Consider an increase in demand, which as noted above, is modelled by a decrease 
in the elasticity of demand. From (15) and (16) the vertices of EE move vertically 
upward. As with the cost increase, the reference price will lay in one the (new) regions 
EE, AE, AB or EB, depending on the position of the reference point and the extent of the 
shift. The increase in demand could therefore result in no change of price and quantity 
14    (reference point remain in EE), a maintenance of price and reduction in quality (reference 
point in EB) or an increase in price and reduction in quality (reference point in AB). The 
firm only adjusts price and maintains quantity, as would be the case in the absence of loss 
aversion if the demand increase places the reference point in the region AE. 
An increase in the substitutability of quantity and quality or a shift in the cost of 
quality can also be analysed in the above way. Each can result in no change of price and, 
a reduction in quality but maintenance of price, an increase in price and no change in 
quality, or an increase in price and reduction in quality. Again, the variety of profit 
maximising responses stands in contrast to the conclusions when loss aversion is absent. 
To conduct the above comparative static analysis it is assumed that the reference 
levels are unaffected by the shock. However in some instances the reference levels may 
shift with a change in one of the exogenous variables. For example, in a survey 
conducted by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986), it was found that customers thought 
it was “unfair to exploit shifts in demand by raising price”. On the other hand, customers 
thought it acceptable to increase price when cost increased. A similar outcome is 
conceivable with respect to quality, although Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) 
consider only price changes. In any event, this finding suggests the possibility that 
customers will change their reference levels in line with observed cost changes, but will 
not change their reference point in line with demand shocks. The economics of this 
possibility is considered in detail by Sibly (2002). The above analysis can be readily 
extended to incorporate this possibility by simply assuming that reference point shifts, 
along with the regions in figure 3, following the shock.  
 
15    3. Efficient Prices and Quality 
In this section the efficient price and quality are determined, and compared with 
the profit maximising price and quality. The efficient price and quality maximise the 
social surplus. The social surplus arising from the consumption of good i is given by the 
sum of consumer surplus, CSi, and profit of firm i:   
 
Si(pi,si) = CSi(pi,si) +  πi(pi,si)   (17) 
where, from (7): 
πi(pi,si)= Ai(pi-c-χsi) p i
-φisi  
κi    (18)   
Consumer surplus is given by: 
CSi(pi,si) = (ln^ p-i - ln^ p)I      (19) 

















 and gi is given by (3). The social surplus provides a 
good approximation of welfare when income effects can be treated as negligible, in 
particular when pixi is a small fraction of users' income (see Tirole, 1988, p. 11). 





⎪ ⎧p2(si) if pi
R > p2(si)
pi
R if p1(si) < pi
R < p2(si)
p1(si) if pi
R < p1(si) 
 (20) 







η(1+λj)  <1. When quality is chosen to maximise the 




⎪ ⎧s1(pi) if si
R>s1(pi)
si
R if  s2(pi) < si
R<s1(pi)
 s2(pi)  if si
R< s2(pi)








χ   and ϖj = 
(σ+λj)
(η-1)(σ+λj)+1. There is a clear analogy between the 
simultaneous conditions for efficiency, (20) and (21),  and the simultaneous conditions 
for profit maximisation (9) and (10). Therefore the analysis of efficiency below follows 
the approach of the case of profit maximisation. 
16     
The model without loss aversion 
Consider the model in which loss aversion is absent, ie in which λ1= λ2=λ.. In this 
case, from (20), the efficient price of firm i satisfies: 
pi








η(1+λ)  <1. As marginal cost is given by c+χsi, equation (22) indicates that 
the efficient price is below marginal cost. Thus, when operating efficiently, the firm 
makes a loss. Intuitively this is due to the effect of relativities: customers’ willingness to 
pay is increased as price is lowered relative to the reference price. This intuition is 
confirmed by setting λ=0, which removes the effect of relativities. Then, as υ=1, equation 
(22) is the familiar condition that price equals marginal cost. From (21) the efficient 










χ           (23) 
and ϖ = 
(σ+λ)





η(1-σ)       ( 2 4 )  
 





χ(1-σ)      ( 2 5 )  
 
Observe that from (25) and (14) si
e = si
*. That is, in the absence of loss aversion, the 
efficient level of quality is equal to the profit maximising level of quality. Thus the point 
representing efficiency in figure 1, πi
e, lies directly below, πi
*, the point representing profit 
maximisation. This result recalls Swan’s Invariance principle. It is the consequence of the 
assumption that customer utility is separable and the marginal cost and the marginal unit 
17    cost of quality are constant.9 The result (25) indicates this principle extends to a utility 
function of the form (1), even in the presence of relativities.  
 
The model with loss aversion 
The set of efficient prices and qualities are shown in figure 4. These are derived in 
an analogous manner to those in figure two, and are also defined analogously. For 
example, if the reference level of price and quality lie in the region EE, then the reference 
price and quality are efficient. Furthermore, if the reference price and quality lie in the 
EB region, then the efficient price and quality lie on the right hand side boundary of the 
EE region, with the efficient price equal to the reference price. 
Also by analogy to the analysis in the previous section, the corners of the region 
EE, Vjk, are useful for conducting comparative statics exercises. Algebraically the points 
Vjk are given by: 
pi =
(η+λj(η-1))c
η(1-σ+λj−λk)      ( 2 6 )  
and: 
si = si,jk      ( 2 7 )  
 
A comparative statics exercise can be conducted on the corners, Vjk, as was done 
above (in the profit maximising case), to indicate how the efficient price and quality 
should be changed in response to demand and cost changes. 
A comparison of (15) and (16) with (26) and (27) indicate that the corners of the 
efficient region EE of lie vertically below the corners of the profit maximising region EE. 
Points in the profit maximising region EE lie in the efficient regions BE, BA or possibly 
EA. Consider a firm setting an equilibrium price and quality. To move the firm to an 
efficient price and quality it is necessary to either (i) lower price if the equilibrium price 
is in the region BE or (ii) lower price and raise quality if the equilibrium price is in the 
region BA or (iii) raise quality if the equilibrium price is in the region EA. 
 
                                                 
9 See Sibly (2002). 
18    4. Discussion 
  In the Spence model, there are smooth substitution possibilities between price and 
quality. The price and quality set by the profit maximising firm are therefore sensitive to 
most changes in economic conditions. For example an increase in marginal cost will 
change the profit maximising level of price and quality. However neither price nor 
quality is observed to be this sensitive. This paper shows that the introduction of 
customer loss aversion offers an explanation of this observed price and quality stickiness. 
To avoid an adverse reaction by consumers, firms will be reluctant to raise price and 
lower quality relative to their reference levels. An increase in marginal cost may therefore 
either have no effect on the level of price and quality, cause price to increase while 
maintaining quality, or cause quality to increase while maintaining price. 
  An implication of the above analysis is that firms will appear to be willing to bear 
‘losses’ in order to maintain either price or quality in the face of an unexpected cost 
shock. This could account for the extraordinary actions of the Saturn motor company 
when, in 1991, it discovered that some of its new cars had been sold with the wrong 
coolant.10 Rather than undertake the minimum required repairs the company gave the 
customers an entirely new car. As the minimum level of repairs would satisfy the 
warranty requirements, this costly decision may not initially appear profit maximising. 
However in the light of the above analysis, it could be interpreted as the firm ensuring 
that customers receive (and expect to receive) their reference level of quality. In this way 
the decision is in fact profit maximising. 
In some instances firms’ marketing efforts could be interpreted as an attempt to 
influence customers’ reference price and allow a smooth substitution of price and quality. 
For example when a firm advertises that it ‘under new management’, it is attempting to 
convince customers to not treat past price and quality as the status quo. If this strategy is 
successful, the new manager is able to vary price and quality without worrying about the 
impact of loss aversion. 
Similarly, the introduction of ‘new models’ allows the firm to, at least partially, 
break the link with the past. Technological advances allow a firm improves the quality of 
                                                 
10 These events are recounted in Whitely and Hessan (1996 p. 221). 
19    its product. But the analysis in this paper indicates that, if the customers do not modify 
their reference prices, it may not be profit maximising to raise price. If it is costly to 
adopt the new technology, it will not therefore be profit maximising to improve the 
quality. The introducing of a new model may convince customer to adopt a new reference 
price, and thereby allow the improvement of quality.   
The quality of a good, as perceived by customers, will usually have many 
characteristics. (For example, the quality of a restaurant may depend on the quality of its 
food and the ambience there.)  When a firm introducing a new technology it is often not 
seen as unambiguously better. (For example modern technology may allow lighter more 
fuel-efficient cars, but some customers may mourn the loss of ‘more solid cars’.) Indeed, 
even if the new product is technically superior, some customers may perceive it as 
inferior. Because of loss aversion, the reduction of particular characteristics may, in the 
mind of customers, not be offset by the gain in other characteristics. Again, the 
introduction of a new model may break the link with the past, allowing a smooth 
substitution across the characteristics that define quality.  
In drawing efficiency conclusions, this paper has assumed that the true value of 
goods is given by the area under consumers’ demand curve when disposition is taken into 
account. This is consistent with the standard approach in economics, where the social 
value of a good is simply consumers’ valuation of it. However, some may argue that 
psychological effects that are captured by disposition should not be incorporated into a 
measure of the social value of a good. (Why should a social planner care whether the 
consumers are aggrieved by a price increase of an under-priced good? See also the 
discussion by Carmichael and MacLeod, 2002.) In this case a welfare analysis would 
proceed as if disposition were a constant (λ=0), and the efficient outcomes would be 
those given by the Spence model. 
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24    Figure 3. Profit maximising price and quality for





















25    Figure 4. Efficient price and quality for
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